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AbstrACt
background In 2009, the Benin government introduced 
a user fee exemption policy for caesarean sections. We 
analyse this policy with regard to how the existing ideas 
and institutions related to user fees influenced key steps 
of the policy cycle and draw lessons that could inform the 
policy dialogue for universal health coverage in the West 
African region.
Methods Following the policy stages model, we analyse 
the agenda setting, policy formulation and legitimation 
phase, and assess the implementation fidelity and policy 
results. We adopted an embedded case study design, using 
quantitative and qualitative data collected with 13 tools at 
the national level and in seven hospitals implementing the 
policy.
results We found that the initial political goal of the policy 
was not to reduce maternal mortality but to eliminate 
the detention in hospitals of mothers and newborns who 
cannot pay the user fees by exempting a comprehensive 
package of maternal health services. We found that the 
policy development process suffered from inadequate 
uptake of evidence and that the policy content and process 
were not completely in harmony with political and public 
health goals. The initial policy intention clashed with 
the neoliberal orientation of the political system, the fee 
recovery principles institutionalised since the Bamako 
Initiative and the prevailing ideas in favour of user fees. 
The policymakers did not take these entrenched factors 
into account. The resulting tension contributed to a benefit 
package covering only caesarean sections and to the 
variable implementation and effectiveness of the policy.
Conclusion The influence of organisational culture in 
the decision-making processes in the health sector is 
often ignored but must be considered in the design and 
implementation of any policy aimed at achieving universal 
health coverage in West African countries.
bACkground
In April 2009, the Benin government intro-
duced a user fee exemption policy (UFEP) 
for caesarean section (CS) for all pregnant 
women who require this surgical procedure. 
The government created a national agency 
(hereafter referred to as the Implementing 
Agency) to implement this policy in 48 
accredited facilities (including 18 non-state-
owned facilities). Under this policy, the Imple-
menting Agency pays facilities a fixed sum of 
XOF100 000 (€152) for each CS, regardless 
of the socioeconomic status of the woman, the 
reason for performing the CS, the facility level 
(primary, secondary or tertiary) or the facility 
ownership (state owned or non-state owned). 
The package only includes coverage for the 
actual CS. Women pay user fees for antenatal 
Key questions
What is already known about this topic?
 ► The implementation of user fee exemption policies 
in West Africa is variable and has led to mixed 
results in terms of equitable utilisation of quality 
health services. The main known reasons for the 
implementation gap are poor planning, inadequate 
financing and limited control of the discretionary 
power of providers. Such policies are developed in 
contexts where the user fee recovery culture has 
prevailed for decades. Little is known about how 
this context influences the policy process of user 
fee exemption policies.
What are the new findings?
 ► This study analyses key steps of the policy 
cycle using a wide range of quantitative and 
qualitative data. It describes how policy actors and 
context shape the policy content and process. It 
shows that the current ideas and institutions in 
Benin related to user fees create a pro-user fee 
organisational culture within the health system that 
negatively influences policy formulation and its 
implementation.
recommendations for policy
 ► This study calls attention to the importance of 
organisational culture in the decision-making 
processes in the health sector. This often-ignored 
dimension of health systems must be considered in 
the design and implementation of any policy aimed 
at achieving universal health coverage in West 
African countries.
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care, uncomplicated deliveries and other obstetric and 
neonatal complications.1 
The user fee strategy is ‘a financing mechanism that has 
two main characteristics: payment is made at the point 
of service use and there is no risk sharing’.2 User fees 
were introduced in West Africa by the Bamako Initiative 
in 1987 and were underpinned by the following assump-
tions: (1) the strategy increases economic efficiency 
because scarce resources are allocated to their most 
valuable use; (2) it enhances accountability of the public 
sector and makes it more responsive to fluctuating pref-
erences and demands; (3) it allows for cost recovery and 
increased equity; and (4) it is based on the principle of 
‘fairness’ as the user pays only for the goods and services 
he or she uses.3
User fees still prevail in West Africa: out-of-pocket 
payments represented between 30%–72% of the total 
health expenditure in 13 countries in 2014.4 However, 
international donors and the scientific community are 
no longer in favour of user fees5 6: user fees constitute 
a regressive form of healthcare financing, imposing an 
unaffordable burden on poor households.7  They hinder 
vulnerable people from the timely use of life-saving 
health services and contribute to sustaining a vicious 
cycle of impoverishment.3 8
UFEPs address financial barriers and have the poten-
tial to improve access to healthcare. They are being 
applied to immunisation, contraception, care for HIV 
and tuberculosis,9 cholera treatment during outbreaks10 
and to mother and child healthcare.11 Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Mali,1 Ghana, Sierra Leone, Senegal12 and Niger13 
have all introduced such policies. From Sen’s capability 
perspective, a UFEP in theory provides ‘additional resources 
in people’s wallets: free healthcare at the point of delivery. This 
resource gives them the opportunity to use public health services 
whenever they feel the need, without being dissuaded by cost’.14 
There is growing evidence that UFEPs increase the util-
isation of services6 15 and reduce the economic burden 
of diseases on households.6 16 17 However, several authors 
called for careful action7 and specific measures to over-
come social exclusion and to ensure that the most vulner-
able groups have equitable access to resources provided 
by UFEPs through better policy formulation and policy 
implementation.18–20 Indeed, in certain cases, UFEPs 
are poorly implemented, with facilities running out of 
resources and forced to stop providing services. In other 
cases, health providers continue charging (partial) user 
fees.21 22
The challenges related to implementation of poli-
cies in general,23 and of UFEPs specifically, are insuffi-
ciently documented. Scholars have identified factors at 
the national level, including poor planning, insufficient 
allocation of resources, delays in distribution of resources 
and insufficient communication.21 24 At the operational 
level, the concept of ‘street level bureaucracy’ has been 
used to explain persistent charging of fees.25 26 However, 
little is known about the ideas and institutions that inform 
the choices of policy actors. Rarely studied have been the 
role of shared values, beliefs and assumptions within the 
dominant organisational culture, nor the role of trust or 
power dynamics27 28 in shaping the different stages of the 
policy cycle.
This paper contributes to filling this gap by analysing 
the agenda setting, the formulation and the legitima-
tion of the UFEP for CS in Benin (hereafter called the 
Policy). Second, it assesses the extent to which the Policy 
was implemented and, third, it evaluates the results.
This study was part of the FEMHealth research 
programme, which ran from January 2011 to December 
2013 in Mali, Benin, Burkina Faso and Morocco. 
FEMHealth adopted a multicountry case study design.29 
It used 13 data collection tools to capture a wide range 
of qualitative and quantitative data on the policymaking 
process, the implementation and the effects of fee exemp-
tion policies at national, regional and district level. Other 
results and lessons from FEMHealth are published else-
where.1 30 31
MetHods
study design, context and analytical framework
We adopted a case study design32 as this allowed us to 
explore different aspects of the ‘natural history’ of the 
UFEP, from the agenda-setting phase to the results, 
including the underlying processes.29 We defined the case 
as the policy cycle related to the UFEP for CS in Benin. 
The study sites were health districts. Benin is subdivided 
into 34 health districts, of which we purposively selected 
five in order to ensure maximum variation in terms of 
population wealth, availability and utilisation of health 
facilities prior to the Policy. To do so, we grouped the 
health districts using Ward’s method of hierarchical clus-
tering33 34 in three categories according to the character-
istics defined in table 1. In each category, we selected one 
or two health districts with characteristics closest to the 
mean value of the category. The five health districts have 
seven health facilities that implement the Policy.
The population of Benin is 10 million, and in 2011, 
the total fertility rate was 4.9.35 In 2011, 87% of deliveries 
took place in health facilities, and 5.4% of all deliveries 
were by CS.35 The maternal mortality ratio in 2015 was 
estimated at 405 deaths per 100 000 live births.36 There 
are about 2600 state-owned and non-state-owned health 
centres that provide maternal healthcare and about 40 
state-owned and non-state-owned hospitals.37
To describe the Policy in general, we adopted the poli-
cy-making stages model.38 We used Kingdon’s multiple 
stream model39 to analyse the agenda-setting phase of 
the Policy. We applied the policy triangle framework 
with its four components (policy context, actors, process 
and content)40 to analyse the policy formulation and 
the policy legitimisation phase. We then assessed the 
actual policy implementation and the implementation 
fidelity (defined as ‘the degree to which an intervention was 
implemented as it was designed in an original protocol, plan, 
or policy’).41 For the latter, we used two variables: (1) the 
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number of CS items provided for free (in accordance to 
the Policy) and (2) the remaining fees related to a CS. 
Finally, we assessed the effectiveness of the Policy using 
three methods:
 ► analysis of the trends in the CS rate, using routine 
health data from 2001 to 2015
 ► assessment of financial protection against catastroph-
ic health expenditure under the free CS policy, using 
as proxy the fees charged for women who delivered by 
CS as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita
 ► assessment of equity in access to care under the Poli-
cy, for which we analysed the trends in CS rates for the 
different socioeconomic groups.
data collection methods
The qualitative data collection methods included docu-
ment review (policy documents, contemporary history 
documents and media publications) and in-depth semi-
structured interviews. Interviewees were purposively 
selected to include policy makers and implementers at all 
levels of the health system, as well as patients and commu-
nity representatives. The above described models and 
frameworks guided the initial selection of documents 
that was expanded based on the preliminary findings. All 
qualitative data were collected in 2012 and 2013 by four 
researchers with a medical and/or socioanthropological 
background.
The quantitative data collection methods included 
structured data extraction from routine medical records 
of the seven selected facilities and from annual health 
statistics reports, which we used to assess national CS rates 
from 2001 to 2015. Data from four consecutive Demo-
graphic and Health Surveys (1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011–
2012) were analysed to measure the population-based CS 
rates, stratified by relative wealth. A financial flow tracking 
study documented the budgets allocated to the Policy, 
the actual expenditure and the adequacy of the payments 
to the health facilities. We also carried out a costing study 
at facility level to assess the cost of performing a CS, for 
which we used interviews with facility managers and data 
extraction from medical records of a sample of 30 CS 
at each facility. The 30 files were selected by applying a 
systematic sampling technique to the list of the 150 most 
recent CS performed in each facility. We conducted exit 
interviews (EIs) with a total of 294 women who delivered 
by CS to collect data on the actual user fees they paid 
during their hospitalisation.
data analysis methods
We conducted an iterative qualitative analysis that 
started during the data collection, whereby new find-
ings and analytical insights were used to adapt the data 
collection tools. All interviews were recorded and tran-
scribed verbatim. Qualitative data were entered in a 
NVIVO V.10 database to facilitate data management. We 
adopted a thematic analysis approach, inspired but not 
constrained by the models and frameworks presented 
above.
The CS rate was estimated by dividing the number 
of CS by the expected total number of deliveries per 
year, providing a proxy of the population-based CS 
rate nationwide. A segmented linear regression model 
using the Prais-Winsten method was used to examine 
these rates before and after the implementation of the 
Policy in Stata V.14, controlling for secular trends and 
adjusting for autocorrelation.42 We used Microsoft Excel 
2011 (V.14.6.7) for all other quantitative analysis. Table 2 
presents a summary of objectives, key research questions, 
data sources, data collection methods and analytical 
approaches. A more detailed description of the different 
methods used within the FEMHealth study has been 
presented elsewhere.43
Table 1 Facilities selected in Benin as subunits of analysis for the FEMHealth research project
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3
Wealth index
(100—mean index of poverty, %)
Low
54.4
Moderate
67
High
75
Availability of health facilities
(mean radius of coverage of health 
centres, km)
Moderate
(5.1)
Low
(12.4)
High
(2.1)
Utilisation of health services
(proportion of institutional deliveries, %)
Moderate
(72.1)
Low
(56.3)
High
(85.5)
Health district selected Health District of Come-
Grand-Popo-Houéyogbe-
Bopa
Health District of Dassa-
Zoume-Glazoué
Health District of 
Nikki-Kalalé-Pèrèrè
Health District of 
Bembèrèkè-Sinendé
Health district of Porto-
Novo-Aguegue-Seme-
Kpodji
Hospitals implementing the user fee 
exemption for caesarean sections policy 
within the health districts selected
District hospital of Come-
Grand-Popo-Houeyogbe-
Bopa
District hospital of Dassa-
Zoume-Glazoué
District hospital of 
Nikki-Kalalé-Pèrèrè
District hospital of 
Bembèrèkè
Regional hospital of Ouémé-
Plateau
Hospital El-Fatheh
Hospital Bon Samaritain
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results
How was the Policy put on the agenda?
In December 2008, Thomas Boni Yayi, president of 
Benin, signed the decree that institutionalised the Policy. 
Framed in the model of Kingdon,39 this ended a 3-year 
process in which the problem stream, the policy stream 
and the political stream were pulled together in a window 
of opportunity.
Problem stream: detention of women and their newborn babies in 
hospitals
User fees were formally introduced in Benin in 1988 in 
line with the cost-sharing principle of the Bamako Initi-
ative.44 It soon became apparent, however, that many 
patients were unable to pay their bills. In response, 
facility managers frequently detained patients (including 
women and their newborns) after discharge until the 
bills were settled. They justified the recovery of fees on 
financial grounds. Patient detention therefore remained 
a component of the problem stream for a considerable 
period, though it was only sporadically documented45 
before 2006, when Thomas Boni Yayi was elected as presi-
dent. While visiting a hospital in northern Benin, he met 
women who had been detained in the hospital for several 
weeks. The president drew attention to this problem and 
newspapers began reporting on the issue.
Political stream, policy stream and window of opportunity
The issue entered the political stream when the pres-
ident committed himself to addressing the problem in 
front of the media, proposing to exempt user fees for 
children under 5 years of age. At that moment, UFEP 
was an option in the policy stream in Benin and across 
the West African region, where it was already applied 
to preventive and curative care within HIV, tuberculosis 
and immunisation programmes.46 The newly elected 
president created a window of opportunity to deliver 
on his electoral promises when he proposed UFEP for 
children under 5 years. To assist in the formulation of 
the Policy, he instigated a process of evidence gathering 
and a participatory approach, which included a series of 
workshops and a feasibility study conducted by a private 
consultancy agency.
Emergence of the focus on CS
During one of the workshops, it was decided that preg-
nant women should be exempted from fees as well: ‘Child 
health starts from conception and necessarily entails antenatal 
care, emergency obstetric and neonatal care, and post-natal care 
to ensure the survival of the child’.47 The report presented a 
cost estimation for a comprehensive UFEP that included 
mothers and newborns,47 based on the tariffs of the 
different services to be exempted. However, it considered 
only state-owned facilities and took into account only the 
direct costs paid for a CS by users, not costs incurred by 
the facilities, based on the assumption that the govern-
ment already supported the latter through subsidies. 
The policy’s cost was estimated at €61 million per year, of 
which about €3 million was for a UFEP for CS only. At the 
end of this process, the government decided to focus on 
exempting costs for CS only for financial reasons.
How was the Policy formulated and legitimised?
To analyse the process of policy formulation and legitimi-
sation, we applied the policy triangle framework of Walt 
and Gilson,40 which includes the policy context, content, 
process and actors.
The policy context
The political context
The Policy emerged in a specific political context. As an 
independent newcomer in politics, Thomas Boni Yayi won 
the second round of elections in 2016 with 75% of the 
votes.48 His political discourse focused on radical change 
in governance and created high expectations among the 
population. At the start of his mandate, he engaged in a 
wave of ‘strong acts’, of which the introduction of the fee 
exemption policy was one. In 2009, households contrib-
uted 43% of the total health expenditure through out-of-
pocket payment (OOP), representing about €12.70 per 
capita.4 In this context, the Policy would translate to a 
savings of €152 for households (previously paid as OOP) 
in the case of a CS. The Policy was considered a political 
‘winner’ and a key strategy for consolidating the presi-
dent’s popularity. Furthermore, it was thought to be a 
relatively simple policy, which would be easy to commu-
nicate and finance.
A clash with the pro-user fee organisational culture of Benin’s 
health system
The political commitment of the President occurred 
against the background of a health system with a strong 
bureaucratic organisational structure49 and what we call 
in this paper a pro-user fee organisational culture. The 
latter was founded on a set of ideas and institutions coher-
ently aligned in favour of user fees with four themes, 
which we will analyse below: (1) a dominant neoliberal 
ideology; (2) user fees as the main health financing 
mechanism; (3) institutionalised fee recovery practices; 
and (4) strongly shared ideas about user fees.
A dominant neoliberal ideology: the current constitution 
of Benin was developed at the national conference of 
February 1990, which formally shifted the country from a 
Marxist-Leninist regime (adopted in November 1974) to 
a liberal economy.48 50 The conference adopted the first 
structural adjustment programme, signed by national 
authorities in June 1989, as the new approach to rebuild 
the economy of the country.48 51 52 Under the new political 
regime, individual citizens were to assume the responsi-
bility for health and welfare, and the state accordingly 
reduced its engagement in the economy and its expendi-
ture through social programmes.53
User fees as the main health financing mechanism: in Benin, 
fee recovery mechanisms have been piloted since the 
1980s,54 for instance through the health development 
project of Pahou. User fees were introduced formally 
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and nationwide in 1988.55 In 2008, the feasibility report 
of the Policy requested ‘the preservation of the Bamako 
Initiative’, stating that ‘Despite this fee exemption policy, the 
Bamako Initiative must be respected in its form and spirit, and 
must function as in the past. (…) Care and care inputs are 
always to be charged and community funding can continue. 
(…) The State pays all or part of the cost on behalf of users’.47 
The State would assume a third party payer role and this 
was expected to create ‘no disruption to the current system of 
cost recovery’.47
Institutionalised fee recovery practices: through observa-
tions in our study sites and from the document review, 
we identified several institutionalised fee recovery prac-
tices. First, fee payment is a systematic prerequisite 
for a patient’s access to health facilities, even in case 
of emergency (‘no cash, no care’). Second, user fee 
recovery agents, locally called ‘cols verts’ (green collars), 
use specific procedures to calculate inpatient user fees, 
trace users and prevent them from not paying. Third, the 
national annual health statistics reports include an assess-
ment of performance in terms of fee recovery by health 
districts. Fourth, we found that hospital managers are 
supposed to meet recurrent expenses related to drugs, 
consumables and certain payroll elements with user fee 
revenue. Both healthcare providers and health managers 
are trained and socialised into developing, implementing 
and monitoring strategies to recover user fees.
Strongly shared ideas on cost recovery: our analysis shows 
that there is a widely shared set of ideas related to cost 
recovery among stakeholders. We found that patients 
tend to normalise the idea that finding resources to seek 
care is the responsibility of individuals as illustrated by 
a pregnant woman saying, ‘if you seek (care) and you don’t 
have money, you will die and it is your loss’. The blame is 
rarely put on the State, which is perceived as incapable of 
financing free care for all. A leader of the midwives’ asso-
ciation referred to this when she expressed her regrets 
that the population does not have a money-saving culture 
to face user fees for pregnancy: ‘Normally, we need that 
culture. A man needs to know that when his wife is pregnant, he 
has to start a ‘tontine’ (community savings group), for example. 
And if the woman has a job, and she is pregnant and she is 
active, she has to start putting money aside’.
We found that policymakers consider user fees as a 
form of community participation that ‘guarantees the 
income of health facilities’. They see user fees as an ‘essential 
complement to public funding, used to compensate for insuffi-
cient public funding and to ensure the day-to-day operation of 
health facilities’. Another view is that free healthcare will 
be abused and taken advantage of by the population. For 
instance, an academic leader in maternal health stated 
that, in the reasoning of the population ‘It is free’ means 
‘I can make profit out of it’, which induces a risk of wastage.
The mother and child health context
In 2006, the maternal mortality ratio was 397 deaths per 
100 000 live births and the neonatal mortality rate was 32 
per 1000 live births. The institutional birth attendance 
rate was 78% and the CS rate was 4%.56 In 2009, nation-
wide efforts were initiated to improve access to family 
planning, insecticide-treated bed nets, immunisation, 
vitamin A supplementation, antenatal care, institutional 
delivery and emergency obstetric and newborn care. 
Efforts to reduce financial hardship for mothers and 
newborns included mutual health insurance initiatives, 
an indigent fund and the free referral of emergencies 
within a district. However, these initiatives were poorly 
implemented.47 57
Legitimisation of the policy
Communication played a key role in the process of 
legitimising the Policy vis-à-vis the (inter)national stake-
holders. Two decrees (Decree N° 2008–730 of the 22 
December 2008 and Decree N°2009–096 of the 30 
March 2009) signed by the president provided legiti-
macy to the Policy as well as some implementation guid-
ance. Other decrees (Decree 2009–146 of the 30 April 
2009 and Decree 2009–455 of the 7 September 2009) 
allocated responsibilities of leadership for the Policy. 
However, the Policy was not enacted in law and there-
fore remains vulnerable to political change. We found 
that the government extensively involved the media to 
inform the population about the Policy. The president 
engaged himself and high-level government officials in 
promoting the Policy with regular visits to implementing 
facilities. Several providers reported being surprised and 
put under pressure to comply with the Policy, since the 
population was informed and was expecting immediate 
benefits.
While the politicians’ discourse focused on improve-
ment of social protection with this policy, some tech-
nical policy actors from the Ministry of Health (MoH) 
described this policy as a means to reduce maternal and 
neonatal morbidity and mortality. Their argument was 
that despite a high proportion of institutional deliveries, 
the CS rate (3.7%) was very low. The MoH staff assumed 
that removing financial barriers would lead to a higher 
utilisation of CS among women needing this life-saving 
intervention. Benin’s international partners are influen-
tial in health decision-making processes and can legiti-
mise national policies by means of their technical or 
financial support. For example, the share of external 
resources in the total health expenditure amounted to 
24% in 2008 and 2009 and increased to 30% in 2011.4 
We found that these actors were quite sceptical of the 
MoH staff’s argument, questioning the potential of the 
Policy to improve mother and child health outcomes and 
doubting the need for a separate Implementing Agency. 
The international agencies were poorly involved in the 
policy formulation. They did not provide substantial 
financial support to the Policy, with the exception of one 
bilateral partner, which started a 5-year project in 2013 to 
complement the Policy with other specific interventions 
to improve quality of CS and neonatal reanimation in 
accredited hospitals.58
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The policy content
As indicated by the official name of the Policy, césarienne 
gratuite (free CS), the Policy aimed to exempt women 
from paying any fees for a CS. The decree defines the 
exempted fees to include the referral of pregnant women 
from a health centre to the hospital, an intravenous infu-
sion, the consultation fee, the cost of the surgical proce-
dure, the cost of drugs and medical consumables, other 
hospital expenses and the postoperative check-up.
The feasibility study noticed some variation in the 
provision of CS and user fee practices in facilities of 
similar levels across the health system. For instance, the 
user fee paid in 2008 in district hospitals ranged between 
€94 and €116. In regional hospitals, it ranged from €90 
to €153, and the range was higher still in national univer-
sity hospitals, from €189 to €317.47 Based on this study, 
the policymakers considered two options to reimburse 
the facilities: an actual cost-based reimbursement or a 
lump sum reimbursement option of €152 for each CS. 
The latter was perceived as a straightforward method to 
achieve the political target while addressing the techno-
crats’ concerns of implementation failure due to high 
costs. The amount of €152 was estimated as sufficient to 
cover the costs of a CS in state-owned district and regional 
hospitals. The same rate was applied to non-state-owned 
facilities, whose cost structure was not examined in the 
feasibility study.
How policy actors shaped the content
We found that several actors played key roles in shaping 
the Policy. As already described, the president placed the 
issue on the agenda and supported the implementation 
of the Policy. The MoH’s Directorate of Mother and Child 
Health played a major technical role during the initial 
stages of policy formulation. This role was subsequently 
taken over by the Implementing Agency, headed by a 
former general secretary of the MoH. His personal expe-
rience and influence were critical in aligning the tech-
nocrats of the MoH with the political process. A leader 
of the University Clinic of Gynaecology and Obstetrics 
represented obstetricians in the process and provided 
clinical evidence. He was also instrumental in creating 
support for the adoption of the Policy by the practi-
tioners and, as a relative of the president, yielded consid-
erable influence. The president of the national associa-
tion of midwives (Association des Sages-Femmes du Bénin) 
was also involved. Through their technical, political and 
social networks, these two actors held powerful positions, 
more so because later they supervised the implementa-
tion process as members of the Implementing Agency’s 
administrative board. Other key actors included the 
health economists of the private consultancy agency that 
shaped the policy formulation. Hospital managers were 
involved to different degrees during all phases of the 
policy formulation and implementation phases. An asso-
ciation of non-state-owned facilities, namely Association 
des Œuvres Médicales Privées, Confessionnelles et Sociales au 
Bénin, was representing 14 of non-state-owned facilities 
initially selected to implement the Policy. The hospitals 
belonging to this association negotiated the approval to 
systematically charge their patients €30 for each CS. As 
mentioned above, the international partners were scep-
tical of the Policy and little involved.
Implementation of the policy
The implementation actors and processes
We found that the Implementing Agency played, and still 
plays, a central role in communication, financial manage-
ment and support. The agency operates as a vertical 
structure, with an executive and an administrative board. 
The former acts as a third-party payer, the latter super-
vises the providers and managers of the hospitals. The 
functions assigned to the Implementing Agency do not 
include monitoring the quality of CS nor ensuring equity. 
The feasibility report stated that ‘The guarantee of equity 
derives from the fact that all women seeking care will benefit from 
the same care, regardless of their socio-economic level or origin’.
Our analysis shows that the agency informed the facility 
managers about the Policy and the procedures through 
letters and directives. It organised training sessions for 
management teams covering the financial and general 
reimbursement procedures. However, no specific guide-
lines or procedure manuals were provided to health 
providers and managers. As we described above, the 
decree is clear about the services that the Policy covers. 
However, we found that the Implementing Agency inter-
prets the term ‘caesarean section’ in its strict clinical sense 
as ‘one or more incisions made through a mother's abdomen and 
uterus to deliver one or more babies’. Strictly following this 
definition, for instance, surgical procedures for ruptured 
uterus are not reimbursed.
The Implementing Agency set up relatively simple reim-
bursement procedures. For each CS, providers must fill a 
form with the identification details of the beneficiary and 
some clinical details of the service provided. The hospital 
management team compiles all information to prepare 
the claim submitted to the Implementing Agency. During 
their field visits, the executive board members use these 
documents for verification. The Implementing Agency 
staff carries out spot controls of the prescriptions and 
bills paid by users in the facilities. Since the government 
allowed direct payment to facilities, the reimbursements 
are faster than other disbursements. From the beginning 
of the Policy in 2009 up to December 2011, the analysis 
of the financial flow tracking data shows that the Imple-
menting Agency reimbursed all 51 913 CS carried out in 
the 44 facilities implementing the Policy at this date for a 
cumulated amount of XOF 5 191 300 000 (€7 914 086).
Finally, the Implementing Agency is intended to 
support the providers in carrying out the Policy. We 
found, however, that the initial supervisory visits were 
inflexible and failed to address practical challenges faced 
by providers:
Doctors, when they treat women who have been referred 
with meconium stained fluid, prescribe strong antibi-
otics to avoid infection, but they (the Implementing 
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Agency supervisors) said: ‘No, nothing other than ampicil-
lin should be prescribed (the antibiotic provided for free 
within the Policy)’. Now that we do not prescribe anything 
else, we see surgical wounds become infected. (Midwife, 
regional hospital)
Implementation fidelity
The policy was initially implemented in 44 health facili-
ties (figure 1). The facilities were accredited on the basis 
of two criteria: not-for-profit status and being capable of 
providing CS. Over time, four more facilities were accred-
ited, including one private-for-profit facility. All seven 
facilities included in this study started implementing the 
Policy in April 2009.
In terms of inputs, the government initially provided 
kits containing all the consumables and drugs required 
for a CS to the accredited facilities. The allocation was 
based on the expected number of CS and came on top of 
the fixed sum reimbursed by the government. However, 
we found that some facility managers interpreted the kits 
as a recurrent measure. The sudden interruption of their 
provision led the managers of some facilities to reduce 
the services in the package.
We found that policy adoption was highly variable 
(table 3). Hospital 2, for instance, provided only one of 
the eight items for free, while hospital 5 provided five. 
Patient transfer, intravenous infusion and the consulta-
tion were not provided for free in five out of seven facil-
ities. When asked why, district and hospital managers 
explained that the operational procedures issued by the 
Implementing Agency did not cover these items. For 
instance, they mentioned that there was no procedure 
foreseen to reimburse users who themselves paid for 
their transfer to facilities. The surgical procedure, hospi-
talisation and the postoperative check-up were almost 
consistently provided for free. We found that drugs and 
medical consumables were partially provided for free. 
Only one hospital fully adopted the free drugs directive.
the policy outcomes
CS delivery rate
As shown in the table 4, 2.3% of all deliveries were by CS 
in 2001. Before the Policy was introduced, the CS rate 
was increasing by an average of 0.2% per year. When the 
Policy was introduced, there was no immediate change 
in the number of CS (P=0.424). However, from 2009 
onwards, there was an average increase in the CS rate of 
0.5% per year. By 2015, the CS rate was 7%. This repre-
sents an additional average increase of 0.3% per year over 
and above the pre-existing secular trend, which we can 
interpret as attributable to the Policy in the absence of 
other interventions that might have increased CS rates.
Actual fees related to CS
Our analysis indicated that since the initiation of the 
Policy, most women were still paying fees related to 
CS. The median fee paid in a facility ranged from €0 
to €41.40. We found that across the seven study sites, 
the fees charged to women who underwent a CS were 
reduced by at least 47%–84%, as compared with the 
prepolicy tariff (table 5). Fees charged to women varied 
across hospitals but also within the same hospital. In one 
hospital, for example, some users received fully free CS, 
while others still paid up to €55.
Financial protection provided by the Policy
We analysed the remaining user fees paid for a CS, propor-
tional to the national GDP per capita for each included 
facility (table 6). The mean proportion ranged from 
6.6% to 15.4%, with a maximum by hospital from 11.9% 
up to 50.1%. Further analysis reveals several patterns. 
Hospital 2 provided better protection: it provided all 
items related to CS for free and charged a maximum fee 
of 12.11% of the GDP per capita. At the opposite end, 
hospital 3 persistently charged fees, ranging from 11.7% 
up to 38.9% of GDP per capita.
Equity analysis
Figure 2 presents the trends in the proportion of deliv-
eries by CS stratified by relative wealth from 1993 to 2011. 
Using DHS data, this graph shows a persistent equity gap 
in utilisation of CS between the richest quintile of the 
population and the other groups in the period of 1995 
to 2009. After the Policy was initiated, that gap actually 
widened: in 2011, more than 15% of women in the top 
quintile had a delivery by CS, compared with around 5% 
for the rest of the population. 
dIsCussIon
In this study, we analysed key steps of the policy cycle 
using a wide range of quantitative and qualitative data. 
We found that the scope of the initially ambitious policy 
was reduced all along the stages of the policy cycle. 
Overall, our analysis showed an increase of the CS rate in 
Benin, from 2.3% in 2001 to 7% in 2015 according to the 
national facility-based statistics and from 3.7 in 2009 to 
6.4 in 2012 if the DHS data are used. We thus found that 
there was a systematic increase in CS rate after the Policy 
was implemented. However, we cannot fully attribute this 
increase to the Policy, even if to the best of our knowl-
edge, there were no other interventions or contextual 
factors that could explain this increase. The increase 
could also be due to better reporting, an indirect effect 
of the Policy, since the reimbursement of facilities was 
directly linked to good reporting. It should be noted that 
the CS rate of women in the richest quintile is still far 
higher than that of women in the lowest quintiles.
We argue that the development of the UFEP for CS in 
Benin can be seen as rowing a course against the current. 
The policy encountered resistance in the form of a domi-
nant pro-user fee culture within the MoH and a neolib-
eral political regime that favoured user fees. Additional 
resistance was mounted by health technocrats who feared 
that the Policy would not be sustainable and put hospitals 
at risk. This fear may have been justified by previous fail-
ures,59 lessons from the other UFEPs in the region22 and 
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Figure 1 Map of the hospitals implementing the fee exemption for caesarean section policy in Benin.
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the international literature calling for careful action for 
UFEP.7 The dominant scepticism about the sustainability 
of UFEP led to preserving the existing user fee recovery 
principles. Such scepticism about UFEP was also reported 
in Niger49 and reflects the lack of confidence in the State 
as a reliable partner.27 In Benin, this contributed to a 
UFEP package that is more restricted than in any other 
country in the region.1 The ‘business as usual’ logic may 
explain why the Implementing Agency was not given addi-
tional roles related to quality assurance or equity. This is a 
missed opportunity as the new resource allocation mech-
anism could have been framed by strategic purchasing 
arrangements60 to increase equity and quality. This stra-
tegic choice would probably have received more support 
from Benin’s international partners.
The policy did not attain its political goal of making 
CS fully free for all. In fact, it tends to benefit women in 
the top quintile more than any other group, thus para-
doxically reinforcing existing inequities. The well-known 
risk of such policies reaching predominantly the richest 
due to prevalent social exclusion mechanisms was not 
taken into consideration by policymakers. Barriers to 
social inclusion, such as limited access to appropriate 
information and limited capacity to reach health services, 
are well known20 21 61 but were not tackled. Equity seems 
not to have been a major concern in the policy formu-
lation phase and was not assessed by the monitoring 
system of the Policy. The development of the Policy 
would have been better if policymakers perceived the 
political commitment and the resources provided by the 
Policy as a means to effectively foster financial access to 
quality emergency obstetric and neonatal care for all 
while explicitly addressing social exclusion mechanisms. 
This, of course, would have required that the principles 
of the Bamako Initiative, which failed to address equity 
challenges for decades,62–64 were placed in question.
One could argue that this is a rather pessimistic view 
because the Policy succeeded in reducing user fees for 
CS at least by 47% (and up to 84% in some facilities) as 
compared with the prepolicy tariff. However, considering 
the resources allocated to this policy, this result is clearly 
suboptimal.31
To some readers, the limited effect of the Policy may not 
be a surprise. After all, one could argue that the potential 
of the Policy to reduce maternal and neonatal morbimor-
tality was overestimated. There is, indeed, evidence 
showing that a narrowly defined policy intervention—like 
a UFEP for only CS—has only limited potential to reduce 
maternal and neonatal morbidity and mortality.65 Such a 
policy may even induce perverse effects by incentivising 
unnecessary CS and thus lead to significant complica-
tions, disability or death, particularly in settings that lack 
the facilities and/or capacity to properly conduct safe 
surgery and treat surgical complications.66
Table 3 Services offered for free under the fee exemption for CS policy in seven hospitals in Benin in 2012
Items Hopsital 1 Hospital 2 Hospital 3 Hospital 4 Hospital 5 Hospital 6 Hospital 7
Number of free 
items (across all 
hospitals)
Referral within the district 0/7
Starting intravenous infusion 
before referral
0/7
Consultation 2/7
Cost of surgery 6/7
Drugs 1/7
Supplies 2/7
Cost of hospitalisation 5/7
Postsurgery check-up 6/7
Free items out of total items 3/8 1/8 2/8 3/8 5/8 4/8 4/8
Black, not free; grey, charged partially; white, free. Source: FEMHealth Report, Benin (19).
CS, caesarean section.
Table 4 Change in CSs per 100 expected live births prepolicy and postpolicy, using national health information data from 
2001 to 2015 in Benin
Average caesarean rate 95% CI P value
Constant 2.3% 1.5% to 3.0% <0.001
Annual trend before the policy (2009) +0.2% 0.07% to 0.4% 0.009
Immediate change in level (2009) −0.4% −1.3% to 0.6% 0.424
Annual trend after the policy (2009) +0.5% 0.3% to 0.7% <0.001
Change in trend before versus after the policy +0.3% 0.07% to 0.6% 0.016
CSs, caesarean sections.
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Our analysis found that the Policy is only partially 
implemented. We identified several factors, some of 
which are related to the Policy itself (narrow target and 
narrow focus), the policy context (with barriers at all 
levels) or the position of the different actors.
We found that international partners did not provide 
much support for the Policy, which is in contrast to 
recent study findings indicating that international donors 
are no longer in favour of user fees.5 6 The position of 
international partners in Benin is different from Ghana, 
where they have more prominently shaped the agenda 
setting of fee exemption for a comprehensive package of 
maternal health services.67 We surmise that the position 
of international actors in Benin was based on the poor 
evidence of the effectiveness of a narrowly focused policy 
(CS only) and concerns regarding the global increase of 
the CS rate and its adverse effects.66
The limited uptake by facility managers can be 
explained by several factors. First, the national strategic 
plan for improving maternal and neonatal health,68 
which was in place when the Policy was being developed, 
did not explicitly consider fee exemption as a policy 
option. This, combined with the pro-user fee culture, led 
to resistance to the Policy by many technocrats. The way 
organisational culture and dominant ideas and institu-
tions shape policy formulation as well as implementation 
of policies requires more attention.
At the implementation level, fees charged to women 
and financial protection varied across facilities and 
within a same hospital. Managers of non-state-owned 
facilities exploited their discretionary power69 in the 
absence of strong governance arrangements and only 
partially implemented the Policy. Managers found argu-
ments to keep charging patients that ignored the effect 
of the Policy on the cost of implementation for non-state-
owned facilities. Also, at state-run facilities, weak gover-
nance and regulation70 is a documented challenge that 
may have contributed to variable implementation. The 
pro-user fee culture prevalent at the central level in the 
MoH made it easier for facility managers and providers 
to continue charging user fees. However, we found 
that some facilities implemented the Policy better than 
others. Further exploration of the different dynamics at 
hospital level may enrich the debate and prevent similar 
mixed responses towards Universal Health Coverage 
interventions.31
The main limitation of this study is the lack of inves-
tigation into how the population was involved in the 
agenda-setting phase. Our interviews with community 
representatives in the local health committees, and 
patients and their families at different maternity wards, 
provided only indirect insights. We may have missed an 
opportunity by not investigating the only private-for-profit 
facility accredited to implement the Policy, which could 
Table 5 Comparison of the tariff before the policy and user fee paid by users for CS under the fee exemption for CS policy in 
Benin in 2012
Facility
Tariff before 
the policy in 
€ (a)
Min charge 
after the 
policy in € (b)
Median charge 
after the policy 
in € (c)
Maximum 
charge after the 
policy in € (d)
Minimum charge 
reduction in € (d−a)
Minimum proportion 
of charge reduction 
in € (d*100/a)
Hospital 1 148.09 0.00 14.68 31.10 −116.99 −79%
Hospital 2 176.82 0.00 0.00 27.44 −149.38 −84%
Hospital 3 140.41 4.12 11.81 34.30 −106.10 −76%
Hospital 4 112.32 2.97 11.63 22.53 −89.79 −80%
Hospital 5 112.32 38.72 41.39 115.71 3.38 3%
Hospital 6 86.13 0.15 5.34 45.73 −40.40 −47%
Hospital 7 122.66 0.00 8.69 54.72 −67.94 −55%
Source: FEMHealth exit interview data, Benin, 2012.
CS, caesarean section.
Table 6 User fees for a delivery by CS under the fee exemption for CS policy in seven hospitals as a proportion of the GDP 
per capita in Benin in 2012
All facilities Hospital 1 Hospital 2 Hospital 3 Hospital  4 Hospital  5 Hospital  6 Hospital 7
Mean (%) 9.53 9.94 6.59 15.38 7.37 10.31 6.98 6.75
Median (%) 8.00 8.42 5.70 14.43 7.27 7.92 5.70 6.35
Minimum (%) 0.00 1.76 0.00 11.71 4.92 2.83 1.33 2.18
Maximum (%) 50.11 50.11 12.11 38.94 11.88 36.00 19.76 17.75
Source:  FEMHealth exit interview data. 
GDP per capita - 2012 LCU, Word Bank data. 
CS, caesarean section; GDP, gross domestic product.
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have provided insights into other dynamics shaping the 
Policy.
Our methods to assess national population-based CS 
rates used data drawn from annual statistics reports, 
based largely on self-reported routine data from both 
state-owned and non-state-owned facilities. Such datasets 
may raise concerns about accuracy and completeness. 
However, CS is likely to be one of the indicators with 
the highest completeness since it is a major intervention 
carried out in a limited number of facilities that are closely 
monitored by the MoH. The Policy has indirectly incen-
tivised facilities to produce quality CS data since 2009, 
which may also explain better reporting of CS in facili-
ties and thus in the annual health statistic reports after 
2009. Triangulating with DHS data may have reduced the 
impact of this limitation in our analysis, but DHS data are 
available only up to 2011.
ConClusIon
In this study, we set out to analyse the key steps of the 
policy cycle related to the UFEP for CS in Benin. We 
uncovered how the policy actors and the context shape 
the policy content and process and found that dominant 
ideas and institutions related to user fees create a pro-user 
fee organisational culture within the health system that 
influenced both the formulation of the Policy as well as 
its implementation.
Policymakers did not address these entrenched 
elements, which led to a persistent tension that affected 
the key steps of the policy cycle. Weak governance 
arrangements allowed both state-owned and non-state-
owned facility actors to continue charging fees related 
to CS. Unless a policy addresses all financial, geograph-
ical and cultural barriers to care, it will not ensure access 
of care for all. Financial protection and equity should 
be emphasised in the organisational culture of health 
systems in Benin and in West African countries at large, 
in tandem with multisectoral efforts for better gover-
nance. Without such efforts, the pathway toward UHC 
will be slow and challenging.
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